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The ethics of administrative credentialing
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA,a Laurence B. McCullough, PhD,a Nancy A. Crigger, PhD,b and
Bruce W. Richman, MA,a Houston Tex; and Liberty, KanA vascular surgeon has practiced in the same com-
munity for more than 20 years, holding privileges at
the two largest local general hospitals. She is widely
respected and admired by patients and fellow physi-
cians in all specialties, and her results are consistently
good. Recently, the board of directors at the hospital
that has been the source of 80% of her case referrals
hired a notorious slash-and-burn management firm to
improve the balance sheet. The new chief executive
officer (CEO) installed an information technology sys-
tem that can provide management with physician-spe-
cific figures on costs and reimbursements. The manage-
ment consultants identified the 10% of physicians with
the worst cost/reimbursement ratios over the preced-
ing 5 years and persuaded the board of directors to
order their clinical privileges withdrawn. Our seasoned
surgeon learns that she is among the targeted group. Is
there an ethical issue here, and, if so, how should she
respond?
A. Move her practice and hope for more referrals.
B. Insist that sole control of the credentialing process be
returned to the medical staff.
C. Contact the accrediting authorities and governmental
agencies with relevant jurisdiction.
D. Hire an attorney.
E. Ask the AMA for support.
Hospitals have been adjusting to an intensely compet-
itive marketplace in the decade since withdrawal of cost-
plus reimbursements. Hospital administrators are painfully
aware that the management model within which they must
function is defective and precarious. Third-party payers
limit revenue by basing reimbursement on disease catego-
ries instead of actual costs incurred by hospitals. Powerful
insurers, operating in a seller’s market, negotiate ever-lower
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seldom seen in ethical nonmedical businesses. The complex
difficulty of controlling hospital costs just compounds the
problem of keeping a positive revenue stream running for a
vital community resource.
Physicians, historically independent of hospital busi-
ness management in virtually all elements of their medical
practice, have come to be seen as the hospital’s uncon-
trolled cost-drivers, a problem administrators have been
addressing with increasing aggressiveness. Acting through
boards of directors, hospital business managers seek to
contain costs and maximize revenues. Certainly all other
businesses do so as well, but in the hospital industry, the
specter of cost cutting must be monitored by medical staff
to ensure no reduction in the quality of medical and surgi-
cal care.
The administrative authority to decide which physi-
cians will practice at a given institution would permit
hospital managers to retain only the most cost-effective
physicians and eliminate those who regularly use more
hospital resources in caring for patients than their case
reimbursements replace. Economic credentialing—and
decredentialing—thus emerges as a powerfully seductive
management tool that can imperil a physician’s liveli-
hood and ability to practice medicine without encum-
brance.
Economic credentialing assumes heterogeneous effi-
ciency among physicians. Data supporting this assumption
are readily available:
● In a recent study of physicians’ economic practice pat-
terns, oncologists treating lung cancer were divided into
high-charge and low-charge groups. Patients treated by
high-chargers received significantly more chemotherapy
cycles, more second-line and third-line drugs, and suf-
fered greater associated morbidity. High-chargers had
the same patient survival rates as low chargers, but with
100% higher costs and increased morbidity.2
● The average cost for carotid endarterectomies done by
one group in the same town was 43.5% higher than
another, with the less expensive surgeons reporting
superior clinical results.3
● Another similar study of vascular surgery practices
found that individual surgeons who used fewer hospi-
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better clinical results than those who cost more.3
● Still another study reported that 46% of “variability” in
hospital charges for surgical procedures was attribut-
able to neither patient characteristics nor category of
procedure, but to the individual surgeon’s practice
style.4
Most sophisticated hospitals have been able to generate
physician-specific financial data for more than a decade.5
One’s initial reaction might be that a medical business—a
hospital—should be entitled to protect itself from wasteful
staff physicians. Historically, at least in theory, the criteria
for appointment and continuation as a hospital medical
staff member have concentrated exclusively on a physician’s
conformity with institutional quality-of-care standards.
There has seldom before been such a protracted frontal
assault upon the concept of medical peer review as the sole
arbiter of clinical quality.
Established hospital accreditation bodies have certified
that only fully trained and licensed physicians constituting
the hospital medical staff—not the hospital’s lay adminis-
trators—may suitably evaluate the performance of fellow
physicians and thereby govern the credentialing process.
We have nevertheless seen the definition of quality in
clinical care slowly melt over the last two decades into
combined considerations of what constitutes acceptable
processes of care, clinical outcomes, and costs.
Clinical quality of surgical care includes mortality and
morbidity—clinical outcomes relative to some standard.
Clinical outcomes are associated with patient demograph-
ics, concurrent disease, and complications. Complications
are independently associated with both cost and mortality
of surgical care, and patient variability explains only part of
the complication rate variances.6
No organization, however beneficently disposed, is
obligated to drive itself out of business by persistently
incurring more cost than it can replace. In the particular
case of a hospital, neglecting its balance sheet to the extent
that it cannot survive to provide continuing services to the
sick and injured of its community would constitute gross
irresponsibility, an ethical outrage in its breach of a critical
social contract. Physicians and hospital administrators share
a cofiduciary responsibility for the welfare of patients who
require the institution’s care,7,8 and that duty includes
making sure that the hospital is financially intact and oper-
ational when patients need it.
The other essential responsibility shared by physicians
and the institutions they practice in is satisfaction of the
public expectation, long fostered by both doctors and
hospitals, that medical decisions will be made solely by
trained, licensed, and experienced medical professionals
and that the sole intent of those decisions will be the
provision of the best available care to each individual pa-
tient. The most basic of these medical decisions is, of
course, the evaluation and selection of physicians properly
trained and experienced to take good care of patients in the
hospital. Intrusion into this process by laymen—and timidacquiescence by physicians in decisions based solely on
economic consideration—deceives a trusting public.
As cofiduciaries, hospitals and the physicians who are
privileged to practice in them are obligated to be technically
competent in patient care, to use their competence primar-
ily for the benefit of patients, and to systematically place
their own self-interest, as organizations and as individuals,
secondary to the welfare of their patients. Among its im-
portant ethical implications, the concept of cofiduciary
responsibility means that hospitals should, as a rule, subor-
dinate their economic self-interest to the well-being of
patients, just as physicians should. Economic stability is
surely a legitimate interest of hospitals because it is a
necessary condition for their having the resources necessary
to meet their cofiduciary obligations to their patients. That
is, economic stability may be seen as a means to the ethically
significant end of fulfilling responsibility, not as an end in
itself.
Many hospitals manage costs through their medical
staff by using continuous quality improvement (CQI) tech-
niques. Modified from industry for hospital application,
CQI employs evidence-based processes of care intended to
improve and preserve patients’ health and functional status.
Happily, and not coincidentally, most patients treated in
this manner not only get over their illnesses quicker, but
they routinely cost hospitals the least, with fewer complica-
tions, shorter lengths-of-hospital stay, and not many unre-
imbursed posthospital clinic visits. CQI, properly imple-
mented, doesn’t aim to reduce costs by cutting corners but
by recognizing that the faster patients get well, the fewer
resources they consume. Using this model, good care can
be legitimately equated with inexpensive care without vio-
lating cofiduciary responsibility.
The previously cited studies suggest that not all physi-
cians provide the best patient care. Geographic and individ-
ual variations in practice styles are sometimes inconsistent
with physicians’ fiduciary obligations and those responsibil-
ities they share with the institutions in which they practice.
Not only are physicians ethically obligated to participate in
institutional CQI activities that have been repeatedly
shown to improve the quality of patient care and contribute
to the continued stability and viability of their hospitals,
they should take the lead in them.
Management decisions that affect patient care and that
are made solely on an economic basis violate lay adminis-
trators’ cofiduciary responsibility, which requires that the
effect of such decisions on patient care must not be left to
chance. Physicians are the authorities in patient care deter-
minations, especially in the determination of the medical
staff’s composition. The physician leadership should review
the economic data objectively and decide whether or not
privileges should be withdrawn. Decisions about creden-
tialing by lay administrators based solely on economic
considerations systematically put the hospital’s economic
self-interest before fiduciary responsibility and undermine
the physician’s essential role in CQI, making such decisions
completely incompatible with cofiduciary responsibility
and, therefore, unethical.
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
Volume 41, Number 4 Jones et al 731Our embattled surgeon is ethically fully justified in
asking her hospital’s chief of staff to convene a medical staff
meeting, suggesting that the hospital CEO be invited to
attend and explain whether the hospital’s new credentialing
policy has been formulated upon evidence-based standards
of quality and cofiduciary responsibility or solely on the
basis of the hospital’s economic self-interest. If the policy is
directed toward improving care, the administration might
be firmly reminded that such matters properly and exclu-
sively reside with the medical staff. The medical staff should
take the lay administration’s views into consideration as it
ponders the question of whether efficient practice is essen-
tial to a determination of high-quality practice when it, and
it alone, deliberates questions of re-credentialing individual
physicians.
If the new policy is not directed toward improving
clinical quality as a means of containing costs, but rather
toward cost reduction as an end in itself, then it is correctly
interpreted to mean that the hospital administration has
made financial success its primary goal. In doing so, the
hospital administrative leadership has disconnected cost
management from cofiduciary responsibility. If so, it can-
not consider its medical staff ethically obligated to follow its
lead or honor its intent. The medical staff might honorably
seek the resignation of an administration that is so clearly an
anathema to the basic ethical principles of the medical
profession and hospital management.
Option D is not a good first response because it fails to
address the ethical issues at the heart of the matter and
would probably disintegrate into the surgeon’s sole pursuit
of personal interest as she fought to maintain her own
privileges. The core issue here is the medical staff’s respon-
sibility for maintaining its informed control of medical care,
including those elements of care that may intersect with
hospital finance. Physicians properly defend their preroga-
tive in these matters, not in their own interest but as the
otherwise unheard voice of their patients. Not only is
hospital care determined by lay administrators solely on the
basis of economic considerations not medical care, it is also
irresponsible management.Option E must fail in all respects because a national
association of physicians can provide support but has no
regulatory authority in such matters. As suggested, Option
B is an appropriate first step, perhaps best introduced in the
context of a medical staff meeting of the sort described. If
this option meets with failure, Option C becomes the
physician’s ethical responsibility; the major hospital accred-
itation organizations in the United States support indepen-
dent medical staff control of its membership. Option A,
dissociation from an untrustworthy and dysfunctional or-
ganization, becomes the third and last line of moral defense
of our surgeon’s professional integrity.
As the practice of medicine evolves in the 21st century,
medical staffs must retain leadership in ensuring that the
goals of hospital managers and trustees remain focused on
improved patient care. This retention of professional power
must be deserved by placing guild mentalities and personal
finances secondary to professionalism.
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